저는 융합(融合)이라는 한자가 떠오릅니다.

融 녹을 융 合 합할 합

녹아서 하나로 합침이라는 뜻의 융합, fusion의 대표적인 것이 자율주행자동차입니다.

자동차의 기존 기술 들에 레이더 센서와 비디오 카메라, GPS, 자동차를 조종할 수 있는 인공지능 소프트웨어가 결합되어 완전히 새로운 자동차로 탄생됩니다.

조금 더 전문적으로 살펴보면 지금까지의 자동차 산업은 기계 공학, 역학의 메카닉스(mechanics ; məkǽniks)였다면, 이제는 여기에 전자공학 일렉트로닉스(electronics)가 합쳐져, 전혀 다른 산업인 메카트로닉스 (mechatronics ; mèkətrɑ́niks)가 된 것이지요.

실제로 자율주행자동차가 대중화되면 시각장애인들이나 고령인구도 운전이 가능해지고 도심의 주차난도 자동으로 해결됩니다.

특히 운전이 안전해져, 미국에서만도 연간 3만 명의 교통사고 사망자가 (보험 끝) 줄어들고, 전세계적으로는 10년 사이에 1000만 명 가량의 목숨을 구할 수 있을 것이라고 합니다.

융합, Fusion은 Future, 미래의 Fu와 비전(Vision)이 합쳐진 ‘미래의 비전이라는 말‘도 있습니다.

기계공학과 전자공학이 결합된 융합의 자율주행자동차사업, 자동차와 IT 전자 산업에 강한 경쟁력을 가지고 있는 우리 대한민국이 미래 비전을 먼저 성취하면 어떨까요?      @ 중 소형 주   전기차, 전자부품,  IOT   등.............  부자 되세요. 必 꼭 !

미국 연준이 금리를 올리기 어려운 진짜 이유

- 미국 자신의 성장 부진, 중국의 불안 및 디플레이션 리스크

- 핵심은, 통화정책에 대한 대규모 중독

일본 사례

- 디플레이션 탈피를 목표로 지난 15년간 공격적인 통화완화 정책

- 2000년을 전후한 시점에 당시 하야미 마사루 일본은행(BOJ) 총재가 오늘날의 '양적완화'(QE)를 개척

- 줄곧 통화완화 정책에만 의존

- 2006년 3월 (후쿠이 도시히코 총재) , QE 종료, 7월 제로금리 정책 해제, 기준금리 0.25%로 인상

- 2007년 2월 - 기준금리를 0.50%로 인상

- 다시 디플레에 빠지면서 , BOJ의 당시 결정은 '섣부른 긴축'의 대명사로 통했고, 이후 엄청난 비판

- 결국 다시 통화완화 정책으로 방향을 선회.( 2008년 , 시라카와 마사아키 총재 )

- 일본 정부와 재계, 언론 : BOJ의 긴축을 비판

- "일본주식회사(일본 경제)는 경제적 마약이 된 공짜 돈이 사라질 수도 있다는 전망에 분통"

미국,

- 연준도 일본의 사례처럼, QE 중단에 따른 비판

- 은행과 기업, 투자자, 정부가 모두 제로금리에 의존

- 금리 인상 시 광범위한 저항에 부닥칠 수도

- 금리 인상에 반대하는 '글로벌 저항'에도 직면

- 최근, 국제통화기금(IMF)이 미국에 금리 인상에 신중할 것을 주문

페섹의 결론

- 일본 사례는, 중앙은행이 국채, 회사채, 자산유동화증권(ABS) 등에 미치는 영향을 확대할수록 더 (긴축 결정을 어렵게 하는) 덫에 걸려들게 된다는 점을 입증

- 미국 연준은 제로금리에서 벗어나는 것이 몹시 힘들며, 다년간의 시련이 될 수도 있다는 점을 이제 막 배우려는 중

Why Is the Fed Stuck at Zero? Ask Japan

Fed policy makers take note: Japan proves that getting interest rates away from zero can be a long ordeal.

By William Pesek  

October 20, 2015

There’s no shortage of explanations why Janet Yellen is reluctant to raise U.S. interest rates: anemic growth, a shaky China, jittery stocks, panicky debt traders, deflation risks, you name it. As valid as all these headaches are, here’s the real reason the Federal Reserve is stuck near zero for the foreseeable future: mass monetary addiction.

To understand this predicament, let’s consider Japan’s plight these last 15 years. Today’s quantitative easing was pioneered around 2000 by then-Bank of Japan Governor Masaru Hayami. While aggressive monetary policies were employed in the 1930s to combat the Great Depression, Hayami took things to new heights as he cornered debt markets. By 2006, his successor, Toshihiko Fukui, reckoned Japan’s foundations were sound enough to move rates above zero. In March of that year, he scrapped the BOJ’s massive bond-buying program. In July, he hiked short-term rates by 0.25 percent. Another step in February 2007 put borrowing costs at 0.50 percent.

Far from being remembered as the great rate normalizer, Fukui’s legacy is one of derision and scorn. In fact, the first act of the next BOJ head in 2008 -- Masaaki Shirakawa -- was to undo those increases. What happened? Japan Inc. went absolutely ballistic at the prospect of losing the free money that stealthily became an economic narcotic.

The absence of borrowing costs made Japan’s unsustainable public debt look manageable. Banks riddled with bad loans appeared almost solvent and corporate balance sheets weighed down by overcapacity and shrinking market share seemed almost sober. Fears the BOJ would take away the punch bowl inspired one of modern history’s greatest lobbying efforts. The Keidanren, Tokyo’s hugely powerful business lobby, cried foul along with a who’s who of banking magnates. The ministers of finance, economic affairs and an even interior took turns at the podium denouncing BOJ hawkishness. Even the prime minister at the time lashed out. Calls for Fukui’s resignation dovetailed with whisper campaigns about his past business dealings. Japan’s compliant media worked to discredit him.

Yet a far bigger outcry awaits Fed Chair Yellen as she tries to tighten, and a global one at that.

Japan demonstrates that the more central banks spread their tentacles into government and corporate debt, asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities, real-estate trusts and exchange-traded funds, the more they get ensnared. The Fed may pull off a rate boost or two. Odds are, that’s it for quite some time -- years perhaps -- as resistance mounts from Wall Street to Capitol Hill.

Imagine the slew of congressional hearings that will be convened to accuse the Fed of killing the American middle class. Or the invective that’ll be hurled Yellen’s way by presidential hopefuls as disparate as Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders. Howls of protest will emanate from Beijing and Tokyo, where officials fret big losses on their U.S. Treasury holdings (a combined $2.5 trillion). Expect broadsides from an International Monetary Fund worried about another crisis in emerging markets.

Likewise, “the Fed,” says Naomi Fink, CEO of Europacifica Consulting in Melbourne, is “facing its own exit dilemma and there is every incentive from those most benefiting from the liquidity to exercise pressure.” The danger, adds Simon Grose-Hodge, head of investment strategy for South Asia at LGT Group in Singapore, “is you get stuck at zero indefinitely, like Japan.”

THE CHINA FACTOR LOOMS LARGE HERE. When IMF head Christine Lagarde counsels Fed caution, she’s really making a plea for Asia’s biggest economy. Don’t be fooled by China’s better-than-expected 6.9 percent growth in the third quarter -- President Xi Jinping’s unbalanced economy is sputtering. What’s more, recent stimulus efforts ensure that if a Chinese debt reckoning arrives it will be even bigger and more spectacular than Japan’s. The last thing Yellen’s team wants, or President Barack Obama’s, is for Washington to be blamed for precipitating it.

Also, shoulder checking China, Japan, South Korea and other key markets would boomerang back on American consumers. These and other potential knock-on effects from Fed rate hikes demonstrate how battling a “liquidity trap” with unlimited monetary policy can lead to an even more inescapable “stimulus trap.”

Fifteen years after Hayami’s QE gambit, current BOJ leader Haruhiko Kuroda is doubling and tripling down on it. Not because it’s succeeding (Japan is still mired in deflation), but because Tokyo refuses to do its part. Since 2000, 10 successive governments -- including Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s -- relied on BOJ largess to support growth, abdicating their responsibility to restructure the economy. This dynamic explains why free-market purists are so anxious to see the Fed avoid the BOJ’s failures.

It won’t be easy. The U.S. is hardly Japan. Its population is comparatively young, growing and productive. And for all the damage wrought by the Lehman crisis, U.S. gross domestic product is 10 percent higher than it was in early 2008, says Richard Katz, New York-based publisher of The Oriental Economist. Japan’s, by contrast, has fallen in 14 of 30 quarters since the 2008-2009 global slump.

Still, bankers, companies, investors and governments come to depend on free-flowing liquidity in ways that won’t seem obvious until central bankers say “last call.” Suddenly, credit spreads blow out in ways that invite downgrades. Inebriated asset classes that barely moved in years shake with volatility. Corporate-earnings multiples stagger back to normalcy and daylight fall on dodgy accounting gimmicks. The finances of heavily-indebted governments veer into hangover territory.

The Fed is about to learn that getting rates away from zero may be an arduous, multi-year ordeal. Fifteen years on, Tokyo’s addition to fee money is still growing.